We examine a microfinance institution's ability to lend to low productivity project undertaken by wealth-less borrowers in two-task 6 moral hazard environment where borrower exert effort on their project and to influence their peer's effort level. We compare the mechanisms of individual, simultaneous and sequential group lending while vary-9 ing the peer-influence function. We show that the sequential group lending has the smallest lower-bound on project productivity if the cost of influencing peer's action is negligible. Conversely, simultane-12 ous lending has the smallest lower bound if cost of influencing the peer tends to infinity.
Introduction

18
In its initial flourish, microfinance became synonymous with the simple idea of group lending. The academic literature was able to show that theoretically joint-liability 1 group-lending was more efficient than individual lending.
2 Yet, 21 in the real world, microfinance uses a complex web of mechanisms in practice that are not fully explored in the the academic literature. Inevitably, there has been a backlash supported by empirical evidence that has questioned the 24 advantage simple group lending has over individual lending.
3
The idea of group lending may suggest that by default all members of the group obtain their loans simultaneously from the lender. Yet, the mechanism 27 of sequential lending, where loans are disbursed sequentially within the group, is widely used in practice 4 and is one of those aforementioned complex web of mechanisms that empowers group lending.
30
In our model, each wealth-less borrower has two distinct costly tasks, exerting effort on their own project and exerting influence on their peer's effort. Specifically, we assume that effort is binary, peer-influence is a con-33 tinuous variable and there are positive cross-complementarities between the two tasks, i.e., influence by peer reduces the opportunity cost of high effort 1 With joint-liability, a lender makes a borrower is made liable for their peer's failure. 2 Morduch (1999) , Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Karlan and Morduch (2010) are excellent summaries of the theoretical literature on group lending.
3 Karlan and Morduch (2010) , Giné and Karlan (2009) 4 Grameen Bank used sequential lending initially for two decades and Self Help Groups in India and Grameen replicators continue to use it today. For detailed description of the lending mechanisms, see Aniket (2003) and Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005, Pages 87-88) for Grameen Bank and Harper (2002) and Aniket (2006) for Self Help Groups. ROSCAs also involve sequential allocation of credit amongst the members. See Besley et al. (1993) and (Klonner, 2008) .
5 Varian (1990) and Chowdhury (2005) have previously modelled sequential lending and this paper complements their analysis.
for a borrower. The costly peer-influence variable captures the connection 36 amongst the borrowers and is reflective of the environment they live in. The objective of this paper is to compare the efficiency of sequential group lending with simultaneous group lending and individual lending, while varying 39 this particular connection between the borrowers. Stiglitz (1990) and Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) have shown previously that joint-liability group contracts are more efficient than individual lending contracts in a single-task 42 moral hazard environment, assuming that peer-influence is costless. Thus, the environment the borrowers live in does not matter in their papers.
The metric we choose to compare the various lending mechanisms is the 45 lower-bound on project productivity.
6 There are apocryphal stories of poor possessing extremely high productivity projects. In reality, there may be considerable variation in productivity of the projects the poor possess (Banerjee 48 and Duflo, 2007) . 7 Low project productivity maybe be as important a factor as collateral in restricting credit to the poor. 8 Reducing the project productivity lower-bound is imperative if entrepreneurial activity amongst the poor 51 is to be facilitated.
6 By facilitating a project, a loan contract creates a potential surplus. How that surplus is shared between the lender and the borrower(s) depends on their relative bargaining strength, which in turn is largely determined by the market structure. Irrespective of the market structure, the least productive projects financed has no surplus left. Thus, as well as being relevant in the context of microfinance, the metric of least productive project financed is a good proxy for the efficiency of a lending mechanism.
7 Low productivity for poor entrepreneurs could be a result of either inherent attributes like lack of skills and ill-health or exogenous factors like lack of public good and markets access. If microfinance has a high lower-bound for project productivity, it would not able to reach either individual or areas where the aforementioned factors conspire to keep project productivities low. 8 Field experiment conducted by Field et al. (2013) looks at what discourages highreturn illiquid investment and finds that it is early repayment required by microfinance institutions.
The paper shows that the optimal output-contingent contract in the simultaneous group lending is an extreme joint-liability contract with no in-54 duced peer-influence.
9 With no peer-influence, simultaneous lending is functionally very similar to individual lending. 10 Though comparatively, the borrowers get lower expected payoffs in simultaneous lending because positive 57 payoffs occur less often with the extreme joint liability contract.
In sequential lending, a randomly chosen borrower borrows first. The second borrower gets the loan with certainty if the first borrower succeeds and 60 with a pre-specified probability if the first borrower fails. The paper shows that with sequential lending, the lender induces positive peer-influence and some joint-liability is optimal in the contract but extreme joint-liability is not 63
optimal.
11 This is because with extreme joint liability, the second borrower will have no incentive to pursue the second project if the first project fails.
In a result relevant for our specific metric, we show that for projects in the 66 vicinity of the productivity lower-bound, the second borrower should always be denied the loan if the first borrower fails. 12 This is not true for projects with higher productivity.
69
We vary the effectiveness of peer influences and look for the mechanism that yields the smallest project productivity lower-bound. The main result of 9 An extreme joint liability contract is an all or nothing contract, where the borrower get positive payoff only if both borrowers succeed and zero (due to limited liability) otherwise. 10 Giné and Karlan (2009) find that (simultaneous) group and individual lending have very similar default rates. The lack of peer-influence when influencing the peer is costly may explain this.
11 If the borrowers succeed and their peer fails, they are penalised for their peer's failure but still obtain positive payoffs.
12 This is because at the margin, the additional output from the second borrower's projects is less than the additional borrower payoff required to continue lending after the first borrower has failed. the paper is that if the cost of reducing peer's private benefit is sufficiently 72 low, sequential lending has the smallest productivity lower-bound amongst the three lending mechanisms. Further, sequential lending approaches firstbest productivity lower-bound as cost of reducing peer's private benefit tends 75 to zero. Conversely, if the cost of influencing peer's action is sufficiently high, simultaneous lending has the smallest productivity lower-bound. Thus, sequential lending may be more appropriate for an intimate rural setting and 78 simultaneous lending more appropriate for an urban ghetto.
Sequential lending has previously been modelled by Varian (1990) 13 in an adverse selection and by Chowdhury (2005) This paper is different from Chowdhury (2005) in the following ways. Chowdhury (2005) analyses the lending mechanisms in a single-task envi-87 ronment whereas this paper does so in a two-task environment. This paper explicitly derives the optimal contract where as Chowdhury (2005) assumes an extreme joint-liability contract where the government sets the loan interest 90 rate. By explicitly deriving the optimal contract, we are able to show that the extent of optimal joint-liability varies between simultaneous and sequential 13 With two types of borrowers, Varian (1990) shows that if the high productivity and the low productivity type are grouped together, sequential lending gives the high productivity type the incentive to school the low productivity type, thus raising the overall productivity of the group.
14 Cason et al. (2012) test the theoretical model of Chowdhury (2005) in the experimental laboratory setting and finds evidence in support.
lending. Further, whereas Chowdhury (2005) evaluates all mechanisms in the 93 same environment, by varying the connection between borrowers we are able to explore how the optimal lending mechanism varies with it. Chowdhury (2005) assumes that in sequential lending, if the first borrower fails, second 96 borrower is denied the loan with certainty. We show that there is caveat to this, i.e., this is not optimal for low-productivity projects in the vicinity of the productivity lower-bound. web of mechanisms it employs in practice.
15 Joint-liability contracts have been assumed in papers like Stiglitz (1990) , Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) , Chowdhury (2005) , Besley and Coate (1995) , Conning (2000) , Van Tassel (1999) 16 Following this approach, we show that whereas extreme joint-liability is optimal for simultaneous lending, only some joint-liability it optimal for sequential lending.
Environment
A project requires a lump-sum investment of 1 unit of capital and produces an 114 uncertain and observable outcome x, valued atx ∈ {0, ∞} when it succeeds (s) and 0 when it fails (f ). Each agent has access to only one specific project.
We will usex, its success value, as a mnemonic for both the project and the 117 agent who has access to that project. The population of agents is distributed over the project rangex ∈ [0, ∞).
The agents are risk neutral, with zero reservation wage and no wealth. 120
Agents may choose to pursue the aforementioned project with a high (H) or low (L) effort e, which is unobservable. With a high (low) effort,x is realised with a probabilityπ (π) and 0 with 1
123
By exerting low effort, agents obtain private benefits of value B from the project which are non-pecuniary and non-transferable amongst the agents.
Private benefits can be curtailed by peer-influence c. An agent can generate 126 peer-influence c by bearing non-pecuniary cost c. e and c are observable amongst the agents but not to the lender. We impose the following assumption on the peer-influence function B(c). The lender is a risk-neutral profit-maximising monopolist in the loan market with access to capital at cost ρ. The lender can observe the initial capital 135 invested, the project output and fully enforce contracts. 17 . The lender cannot directly influence private benefits himself and can only incentivise the agents through pecuniary payoffs. We also assume that there is full commitment to 138 the loan contract from the lender and borrowers side. To focus on the moral hazard problem, we assume that
from a social perspective, high effort on a project breaks-even but low effort 141
does not break-even.
Each agent borrows 1 unit of capital to undertake their project. In individual lending, a borrower's payoff b i is contingent on i = {s, f }. In 144 group lending, the borrower's payoff b ij is contingent on borrower's output i = {s, f } and her peer's output j = {s, f }. We assume that borrowers' project outcomes in a group is statistically independent.
18 Assumption 2 147 ensures that the payoffs are always non-negative.
Assumption 2 (Limited Liability). In individual lending,
Individual Lending
In individual lending, the borrower undertakes a project if she accepts the lender's contract. With perfect information, the lender can observe the bor-153
rower's effort level and project outcome. The lender offers the borrower a 17 To focus on the hidden action problem, we assume away the problems of hidden type, costly state verification and contract enforcement. These problems are explored comprehensively in papers like Ghatak (1999) , Ghatak (2000) , Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) , Rai and Sjöström (2004) and Besley and Coate (1995) .
18 That is, if agent B 1 exerts high effort and agent B 2 exerts low effort in group lending, the likelihood of state ss is simply ππ. 
Second-Best
With incomplete information, the borrower's effort is unobservable to the lender. To elicit high effort, the lender would have to satisfy the borrower's 162 yields a smaller productivity lower-bound than the low effort contract.
Group Lending
A groups consists of two borrowers, B 1 and B 2 , seeking loans from the lender 171 to undertake their respective projects. The lender can observe the state ij, where i = {s, f } and j = {s, f } are the B 1 's and B 2 's project outcome respec-
19 If the incentive compatibility and the limited liability constraints are satisfied, the participation constraint would always be satisfied. 20 The contract ensures that the incentive compatibility constraint binds and the limited liability constraint binds only for state f .
tively,
21 and offers the both borrowers a symmetric group-lending contract 174
(b ij ). The borrowers borrow simultaneously in section 4.1 and sequentially in section 4.2. We derive the optimal contract and in the process determine the extent of joint-liability that is optimal for each group lending mechanism. 177
Confining our analysis to symmetric contacts in group lending allows us to pin down the effect of sequencing the loan. Further, given that the borrowers usually get symmetric contracts in microfinance, it is not unreasonable 180
to assume so in our analysis here.
Simultaneous Group Lending
In simultaneous group lending, borrowers borrow simultaneously. The timing 183 of the game is as follows: t = 0: The lender offers B 1 and B 2 an identical contract (b ss , b sf , b f s , b f f ). If they accept the contract, the game continues.
Otherwise, it terminates. t = 1: B 1 and B 2 choose their respective peer-186
influence intensities c 1 ∈ [0, ∞) and c 2 ∈ [0, ∞) simultaneously. t = 2:
Given (c 1 , c 2 ) chosen at t = 1, B 1 and B 2 choose their respective effort levels e 1 ∈ {H, L} and e 2 ∈ {H, L} simultaneously. t = 3: B 1 and B 2 's project 189 outcome is realised. Both borrowers get payoffs b ij depending on the realised state ij, where i, j = {s, f }. Lemma 1 summarises the conditions under which the both borrowers have the incentive to exert high effort. 21 ss where both B 1 and B 2 's project succeeds, f f where both B 1 and B 2 's project fails, sf where B 1 's project succeeds and B 2 's project fails and f s where B 1 's project fails and B 2 's project succeeds.
22 If borrower k = {1, 2} exerts effort e k , P (i | e k ) is the probability of a borrower k's project resulting in outcome i. E[b ij | e 1 e 2 ] = i j P (i | e 1 )P (j | e 2 ) b ij . For ease of exposition, we use the mnemonic P (s | e k ) = π k where π k =π if e k = H and π k = π if e k = L. 
(1)
We show in Appendix A that if (1) and (2) are satisfied, the borrowers would exert high effort on their own projects at t = 2. This is true for all possible (c 1 , c 2 ) combination chosen at t = 2 where c 1 , c 2 ∈ [0, ∞). and (2), the borrower are compensated for forgoing B 0 , the maximal value of private benefits, because a borrower i's peer can always choose to not influence their peer by opting for c j = 0 at t = 1.
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The lender's problem (P sim ) is min b ij E[b ij | HH] subject to (1) and (2).
The problem is solved in Appendix A.1 and the results are summarised in Proposition 1.
207
Proposition 1. In simultaneous group lending, the optimal contract has the following characteristics:
i.
(1) binds and (2) is slack,
210
ii. there is no peer-influence, i.e., c 1 = c 2 = 0 and
The optimal contract has extreme joint-liability, i.e., b ss =
We show in Appendix A.1 that (1) binds and (2) 
Sequential Group Lending
In sequential group lending, only one borrower in the group can borrow at a time. We assume that the lender randomly chooses the first borrower in the 228 group. Let's call the first borrower B 1 . If B 1 's project fails, B 2 gets a loan with a probability ε ∈ [0, 1]. Conversely, if B 1 's project succeeds, B 2 gets the loan with certainty.
231
In sequential group lending, we have an additional state of the world f . 
25 We add this new state f to the states ij, where i, j = {s, f } 26 This is the intensity with which B 2 chooses to influence her peer B 1 .
We show in Appendix B that if (3), (4) and (5) are satisfied, B 1 and 246 B 2 will exert high effort at t = 2 and t = 5 respectively. (5) ensures that B 2 has the requisite incentive to choose peer-influence intensity of at least
B 1 will have the incentive to exert high effort at t = 2. At t = 3, the success and failure of B 1 's project creates two distinct subgames. (3) and (4) . Thus, for a contract to satisfy (3), (4) and (5), the contract has to take a form where b ss = (1 +πε) 
Comparing the Lending Mechanisms
The two group lending mechanisms put a lower bound on the group's average 282 productivity and not explicitly on individual borrower's project productivities. Variation in individual project productivities within the group is entirely feasible. Thus, group lending has an added advantage over individual 285 lending, wherex x indv for each individual borrower. 
30
(Referees' Appendix C.1)
2 cseq ∆π > 0 shows thatx seq , the lower bound for sequential group lending, is increasing in ε. This is because along the lower boundx seq (ε) locus, the expected marginal cost always overwhelms the ex-297 pected marginal output from increasing ε. That is, increasing ε at the margin never creates a surplus that could potentially decreasex seq .
31 Thus, setting ε = 0 minimises the lower bound on group's average productivity and the 300 lender would not continue the game at t = 3 if B 1 's project fails.
Varying the Peer-influence Function
To compare the lending mechanisms, we assume a slightly modified peer-303 influence function B(c, β) = B 0 + β · b(c), which is separable in B 0 and b(c), the reduction in private benefit from peer-influence. This may represent the urban ghetto where a borrower's peer-influence may not have any influence at all on her peer's action.
315
Proposition 4. There existsβ 1 andβ 2 such thatx seq (β 1 ) =x indv and are defined byx seq (β 1 ) =x indv andx seq (β 2 ) =x sim . It follows that for a sufficiently effective peer-influence function β ∈ (β 2 , ∞), the lender would lend to 327 projectsx ∈ [x indv , ∞) under all three mechanisms, projectsx ∈ [x sim ,x indv ) under simultaneous and sequential lending and projectsx ∈ [x seq ,x sim ) only under sequential lending. The analysis here is done for ε = 0 but could be done for any arbitrary ε ∈ (0, 1]. 33 In section 3.1 we had assumed ρ ππB0 (∆π) 2 . For a given environment withβ, if c seq (β) There is no peer influence in individual and simultaneous lending and the borrowers' payoffs don't vary with β. In sequential lending the borrowers' expected payoff depend on c seq , which is decreasing in β. Conversely, the 333 expected output per unit of capital lent by the lender is lower in sequential lending as compared to individual and simultaneous lending. This is because the lender finds it optimal to stop lending if the first borrower fails. 336 Thus, when β → 0, the borrower's expected payoff in sequential lending is very high andx seq (β) >x indv >x sim . As β increases,x seq decreases and we find that for a sufficiently high β, i.e., β >β 2 ,x indv >x sim >x seq (β). 339
Further, with an extremely effective peer-influence function, unlike simultaneous and individual lending, sequential lending approaches the first best, i.e., lim β→∞xseq = ρ π .
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Appendix
A Simultaneous Group Lending
We analyse the game described below for a given contract (b ss , b sf , b f s , b f f ). 345 For a subgame ξ(c 1 , c 2 ), B 1 and B 2 's respective payoffs from exerting effort e 1 and e 2 respectively are Π 1 [e 1 , e 2 , c 1 ,
, we need an additional assumption ρ 2 1+π ππcseq(β) (∆π) 2 to ensure that the high effort sequential lending contract yields a lower project productivity lower-bound than the individual lending low effort contract discussed in section 3.1. Given that 
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We first analyse a subgame ξ (c 1 , c 2 ) , where c 1 , c 2 ∈ [0, ∞), of the game described in Section 4.1 before moving up the tree. In the subgame ξ (c 1 , c 2 ) ,
B(c 2 ) and B 2 has no incentive to deviate from HH(c 1 ,
Similarly, B 1 and B 2 has no incentive to deviate from LL(c 1 ,
HH(c 1 , c 2 ) and LL(c 1 , c 2 ) are both Nash equilibria in subgame ξ(c 1 , c 2 ) if
In this case, a borrower B k with peer B k would prefer HH(c 1 , c 2 ) over 34 For ease of exposition, we useē 1ē2 (c 1 ,c 2 ) as a shorthand notation to refer to a particular outcome where B 1 and B 1 choose effort levels e 1 =ē 1 and e 2 =ē 2 respectively in the subgame ξ(c 1 ,c 2 ). Thus, for instance, LH(c 1 ,c 2 ) refers to a situation where B 1 and B 2 choose c 1 =c 1 and c 2 =c 2 at t = 1 and choose e 1 = L and e 2 = H at t = 2 respectively. Since we have assumed that the the project returns of borrowers in a group are statistically independent, the likelihood of state ss occurring with e 1 = L and e 2 = H is given by ππ.
would prefer HH(c 1 , c 2 ) over LL(c 1 , c 2 ) if
Lets roll back the game and analyse B 1 and B 2 's simultaneous decision on (1) and (2) is satisfied.
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A.1 Optimal Contract in Simultaneous Group Lending
The lender effectively minimises E[b ij | HH] subject to constraints (1) and (2). The lender's problem (P sim ) can be written as the following Lagrangian.
The first order conditions are given below.
(10) and (12) give us λ =π and µ = −π. Evaluating the first order conditions at λ * =π and µ * = 0, we find that ∂L ∂bss =ππ > 0,
binds and (2) is slack and it is optimal to set b sf = b f s = b f f = 0 and 
(18) and (19) can be summarised as condition (5).
B.1 Optimal Contract in Sequential Group Lending
The lender minimises E[b ij | HH] subject to (3), (4) . Using these values, we can show from (26) and (27) (28) and (29) solves 384 the problem (P seq ).
C Appendix for Referees
441
C.1 Sequential Group Lending: Break Even Condition
This elaborates on the discussion on page 15 following Proposition 3 in section 5.
444
Expected output:π (1 +π) + (1 −π)ε x 2x with probabilityπ 2 (both succeeds)
x with probabilityπ(1 −π) (B 1 succeeds and B 2 fails) This establishes that there is a lower bound of ρ for which high effort contract in each mechanism yields the smallest productivity lower-bound. It 459 is clear that ρ indv ρ sim . ρ seq (β) maybe greater than ρ indv for β ∈ [0,β) where c seq (β) = . This is further explored in Footnote 33 in section 5.1 on page 17. 
